USS Houston SSN-713

Before reading this post, please watch this video clip from the movie "The Naked Gun".  In the video clip, OJ Simpson has just announced that he's a cop and that everyone in the room is under arrest.  Hilarity ensues.

I suggested watching this video before proceeding with the post, because I was reminded of this scene while reading about the early years of USS Houston, SSN-713.  This post might come across as a little harsh, but it's not intended that way.  It's actually very instructive as to how a momentary lapse of attention or judgement can put the entire ship at risk.


Below:  USS Houston SSN-713.  Taken during a rare moment when she wasn't involved in a life-threatening calamity.

USS Houston was a Los Angeles (688) Class nuclear-powered attack submarine.  She was laid down in January of 1979, launched March 1981, commissioned in September 1982, and decommissioned in August 2016. 

For general details about 688 class submarines, see the first few paragraphs in this post.  USS Houston is a sister ship of USS San Francisco.

The Wikipedia article about USS Houston contains sea-stories about a series of errors that endangered the ship.  It reads less like an encyclopedia entry than a disgruntled rant.  I'll quote it quite a bit in this post, and comment a little on each event.  The Wikipedia segments of this post are indented.

Starting out:  Houston was selected to play the USS Dallas in the movie, "The Hunt for Red October"

Houston is an experienced actor, initially starring in a Navy recruiting film and then getting her "big break" in June 1989 with a part in The Hunt for Red October (where she played her sister ship Dallas). However, that summer and autumn were plagued with mishaps.

I have never watched The Hunt for Red October.  I was so fed up with the Navy and submarines at the end of my enlistment that the last thing I wanted to do was watch a rah-rah movie about one.

The first incident follows, obviously without references to any documentation - thus, a sea-story (but also probably an eye-witness account):

In May 1989, before getting involved with the film, a broken valve caused a depth excursion. However, the "depth excursion" was actually a full blown flooding incident that was not caused by a "broken valve".

In fact, while conducting a weapons certification inspection prior to a scheduled westpac, the Officer of the Deck (OOD), directed the Chief of the Watch (COW) to silence the induction sump tank alarm due to constant cycling. The OOD then directed the COW to pin open the diesel head valve in order to stop the constant cycling of the pneumatic actuator (due to state 3 seas).

Upon securing the antennas (the boat was ventilating while near the surface to pick up routing radio traffic), the OOD directed the boat to return to its regular patrol depth. However, because no Fan Room watch was set when the alarm was cut-out, nobody immediately noticed that water was dumping into the Fan Room when the boat started to dive.

It wasn't until there was an announcement of flooding in the Torpedo Room over the 4MC that the crew went to General Quarters. At this time, the Throttleman answered ahead-full and the OOD ordered a five-second emergency blow of the forward ballast tanks. Of course, when the boat went to a positive bubble, all the water in the ventilation system dumped into the engine room.

After broaching the surface, the boat went nose down again (still at ahead full), and began a second downward descent. The CO finally ordered a full emergency blow to get Houston back to the surface.

Below:  A snorkel valve with the fairing removed.  This sits atop the snorkel mast.  The snorkel valve is normally held shut by a powerful spring.  Opening the valve against this spring tension requires an electrical circuit to open an air valve.  This high pressure air forces the snorkel valve open.  When a wave washes over the snorkel valve, the seawater makes contact between a set of electrical contacts.  This bleeds off the high pressure air, and the springs slam the valve shut.  When the wave passes, the electrical circuit is no longer in contact, high pressure air slams the valve back open again. The spring-close mechanism makes it fail-safe, meaning that if the control circuits lose air or electricity, the valve fails shut, and prevents water from entering the ship.

Nobody was harmed during this event, so it's a bit comical.  To recap this sea-story with some explanation.

Houston was in rough seas at periscope depth, and was ventilating (taking in fresh air) through the snorkel mast.  The Officer of the Deck got annoyed by the racket of the snorkel mast head valve automatically slamming open and shut as waves continuously washed over it.  The induction sump alarm was also going off intermittently, because in heavy seas, some water gets in the snorkel before the valve can shut.  No doubt the racket of the head valve and the intermittent alarm were distracting during an intense and busy period at periscope depth in rough seas.

The OOD apparently ordered the Chief of the Watch silence the alarm that water was accumulating in the induction sump via the snorkel, and he also ordered him to force the snorkel valve open.  He did not station a man to watch the room where the snorkel mast discharged air into.  These were all poor decisions.  The sea-story does not say whether or not this was a common practice on board Houston. 

After they were done taking care of business at periscope depth, the Officer of the Deck dove the ship with the snorkel mast valve still forced open.  This began flooding the ventilation system of the ship.

The first indication of trouble came from the Torpedo room, which is two levels below the fan room.  Sea water was probably pouring out of the ceiling, which most submariners would find alarming.  Someone in the torpedo room activated the flooding alarm. 

Standard procedure for flooding is to order the engines to ahead full.  This is done to gain speed and drive the ship up to the surface.  The forward ballast tanks were also blown for 5 seconds.  When the forward ballast tanks were blown, the ship went nose-up, and the water in the fan room shifted aft, probably making it go even more nose-up.  After the unplanned ascent, the ship broached the surface then went nose-down as the air was released from the vents at the bottom of the forward main ballast tanks.  She then began unplanned descent (still at ahead full throttle!!!) which was only stopped by a full main ballast tank blow.  This action was ordered by the Commanding Officer - who had apparently taken command of the ship away from the Officer of the Deck.

In the space of a few minutes we have a self-induced flooding, loss of control of the ship, uncontrolled surface, uncontrolled descent, and a second uncontrolled surface - in heavy seas.  Not too shabby.

Below: I remember seeing these on the news, and these are legit events - There are references.  It's not at all funny because a guy lost his life.  Both of these events could have happened to any submarine, so it's not a problem specific to Houston. Probably just bad luck.

Then on 14 June, during the shoot, Houston snagged a tow cable, sinking the tugboat Barcona in the San Pedro Channel near Santa Catalina Island, and drowning a tugboat crewmember. While sonar was aware the tugboat was in the area (designated as Sierra 22) it was on a course that was well west of the boat.

Then, two days later, after filming wrapped, Houston was en route to San Diego, California when she was caught in the net of the fishing boat Fortuna. The nets were destroyed, but no injuries were reported.

This next section is another sea-story, so once again there are no references.  It's also probably true.

On 1 July 1989, Houston left port for a training run. A few days into the training schedule, a standard low-pressure ventilation procedure was conducted at periscope depth. Suddenly and unexpectedly, seawater began flooding from the main air vents. The boat took a sharp up-angle and began driving toward the surface, but lost headway to the weight of the water she had taken on and began to slide backward. Seawater reached the battery compartment and chlorine began to rise from the battery well.

The full power of the Houston’s engines restored headway and drove her to the surface. As soon as she broached, however, she lost her up-angle, and the thousands of pounds of water in her bilges rushed forward. The boat pitched forward, taking on a steep down-angle. Pulled by the weight of the water and pushed by the full power of her engines, Houston dove precipitously.

The engines were reversed in a crash-back maneuver and an emergency ballast tank blow was performed. Houston’s plunge slowed, reversed, and she shot up again, this time remaining on the surface.

Houston returned to port after a long and slow surface transit. The main snorkel valve had failed to close properly. An audible signal that would indicate the valve's opening and closing had been disabled. Eight crewmen were transferred from the Houston, although not all left the submarine service.

This event sounds remarkably similar to the previous event.  These could be different accounts of the same event, however the Wikipedia article says they took place a couple of months apart.  Disciplinary action is mentioned in the second sea-story, as well as battery flooding.  We are left with a mystery as to whether it's two separate events or the same event described at different levels of detail by different witnesses.

Below:  Tough times.  There is not enough detail to determine whether there was a training or maintenance issue, or just bad luck.

Houston's troubles were not over. On 1 August, an electrical fire ignited in the engineering spaces. In September, because of a navigation error, the boat had a close call with a torpedo launched from a helicopter in a training exercise. In November, a navigation error caused the loss of the boat's towed sonar array. 

Below:  This sounds like a few errors by a single green Officer of the Deck.   

Following a Depot Modernization Period in 1991, Houston experienced a few incidents related to the relative inexperience of her new crew. One of these incidents occurred during her first underway following the DMP. While on the surface proceeding out of Pearl Harbor, the OOD (Officer of the Deck), who was in the sail, failed to compensate for the Captain ordering a higher speed than previously briefed.

Because of this, the OOD ordered a turn later than he should have and the boat came within 100 yards of striking the remains of an old concrete pier. Shortly thereafter, out of the channel and in into open ocean, the same OOD ordered ahead full while the forward escape trunk was still open. Those who know 688 class submarines know that water washes over the deck aft of the sail when the ship is at ahead full. The error was realized when the first call of "flooding in crews mess" was made over the 1 MC.

Below:  More tough times.  Nothing in the main propulsion system has decent access, so an issue with any part of it quickly becomes nightmarish.  Houston's problem was external to the pressure hull, so there was an added level of hassle.

Houston deployed again to the West Pac in the Spring of 1994.  This deployment was quickly marred by mechanical difficulties when the ship's aft stern tube bearing failed 6 weeks into the deployment. The Herculean repair involved an in water screw removal and the use of a floating crane towed in from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.
For nine weeks Houston was stuck in port while a special team from Pearl Harbor repaired the stern tube bearing. With her screw replaced, Houston returned to her sea duties in late August 1994.

Below:  Refrigerant leaks, breathing forced air, saved the food.

In December 1998, Houston was off the coast of southern California during a training exercise when the common discharge flex coupling for the boat's R-12 units ruptured. R-12 is a refrigerant that is used in air-conditioning and refrigeration units.

The quick actions of the crew allowed the R-12 to be ventilated overboard while the crew were in emergency air-breathing apparatus (EABs) that protected them from the asphyxiating effects of the gas. A quick stores off-load also saved the perishable foods in the refrigeration compartments. A subsequent and similar rupture happened again in late 1999.

Below:  Loss of the ship's anchor.  Submarine anchor machinery is complex and rarely used, so it's not surprising there was an incident.  When a submarine anchors offshore, half the propulsion guys are required to stay on board and provide electrical power, while everyone else can go ashore.  When you have to steam in circles, half the entire crew has to remain aboard. At the halfway point during the ship's visit, the guys on liberty return to the ship, and the other half of the crew go on shore liberty.  I have a story about that.

In September 2000 Houston lost her anchor while attempting to anchor off the coast of Pattaya Beach, Thailand for a port call. In order for the crew to get a few days of much needed liberty, the crew was divided and took turns steaming the ship around the bay while their counterparts were ashore.

Below:  Another bad day under the sea - probably another green OOD.  Hopefully by this point, they were taking a long, hard look at the quality and content of their officer training programs.

On 21 June 2001 Houston was conducting normal training operations in the Pacific off the coast of Washington state, which included a "crash back" drill, in which the ship goes from ahead flank (maximum forward speed) to back full emergency (maximum engine power in reverse). The maneuver proceeded well, despite the tremendous shaking, noise, and stress the maneuver creates, until the boat began to gain sternway (actually moving backwards through the water).

When a vessel is moving backwards, her rudder and, in the case of a submarine, her planes, function in the opposite manner than when she is moving forwards. The stern planesman failed to compensate for this phenomenon and continued to try to trim the boat as if they still were making headway.

When the stern began to rise, he raised the stern planes, which would have depressed the stern if they had been moving forward. While making sternway, it had the opposite effect, increasing the down-angle. The stern continued to rise, more rapidly as the boat accelerated backwards.

Before the problem could be corrected, Houston had attained a 70 degree down-angle and her screw broached the surface while still turning at a high rpm. The control team performed a partial emergency ballast tank blow and safely surfaced the boat, and the engineering team safely scrammed (emergency shutdown) the reactor plant to prevent damage.

This last one is crazy.  First of all, the crash-back should have been terminated by the Officer of the Deck when the ship reached zero speed.  Nobody is trained to handle a submerged boat going in reverse  No planesman (or airplane pilot, for that matter) should have to deal with such a situation - It shouldn't even be allowed to happen.

Moving in reverse while submerged led to a major depth control problem (duh), and the boat surfaced tail first at a 70 degree angle with the main engines in reverse at max speed.

I can't even imagine being in that situation.  You could easily fall to your death across a compartment.  The reactor was intentionally scrammed. This was probably due to loss of level indication in the steam generators and reactor pressurizer caused by the ship's angle.  I'm not sure if "comical" describes this situation, but fortunately nobody lost their life.

The final indignity, a minor primary coolant leak:

On 1 August 2008 the Navy reported to CNN that Houston was found to have been leaking radioactive water for months while on patrol and visiting stations in Japan, Guam and Hawaii. The problem was discovered the previous month during servicing at Pearl Harbor. One crewman was exposed to radioactive water but not injured.

The Navy reported that the Houston's leak released only a "negligible" amount of radioactivity.^[4] The Navy later expanded the estimated time the leak existed to nearly two years, although they maintained the amount of radioactivity leaked was very small – "less than a smoke detector".^[5]

Houston somehow survived long enough to be decommissioned, in August of 2016.  And now you know why the movie clip from the beginning of this post is appropriate.